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so limited that it is unlikely that it will be able to pay in full for the damage
done.46 Our government has made some provision for the return of identifiable
property, but it may well be that with respect to other types of claims the only
equitable solution will be for those injured to share the resources available. This
does not mean in the principal case that if the insurance proceeds are not considered identifiable, the Belgian corporation will necessarily be able to keep
them. It might be required to turn them over to an Allied commission, but this
would seem to be a matter to be settled by the Allied governments.
Moreover, even with respect to identifiable property in the United States it
is arguable that to insure uniformity of treatment these claims, as well as all
others, should be handled by a single agency. 47 Intricate questions as to the
measure of damages and what constitutes duress will arise, and it might be that
a court acting within Germany could best handle these problems.
At any rate, it seems clear that the problems are so complex that they should
be left to the executive until such time as he permits the courts to take jurisdiction.

SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE SUIT AS CHECK ON
CORPORATE ANTI-LABOR POLICIES
The fiduciary obligations of corporate directors may have been strikingly enlarged as a consequence of a recent New York decision which upheld the sufficiency of a stockholder complaint alleging that the Remington Rand Company
had suffered monetary losses because of the anti-labor policy pursued by its
board of directors during the period 1934-1937. The chief allegations were that

the directors had ordered the dismantling and removal of corporate plants and
the curtailment of production with a resulting loss to the corporation in excess
of a million dollars, that these acts were not within the scope of reasonable business judgment but were designed solely to intimidate the corporation's employees, and that the directors permitted themselves to be dominated with respect
to the corporation's labor policies by one who, it was asserted, was actuated by
anti-labor bias and personal prejudices. The New York lower court dismissed
the complaint and the Appellate Division affirmed on the ground that "stripped
of its conclusionary statements" it "shows only a reasonable exercise of business
judgment by the directors" and that "no facts are set forth which show that
appellants [defendants] had interests adverse to the corporation or that they
dealt with the corporation for their own benefit or that they were guilty of waste
or fraud."' The New York Court of Appeals reversed, however, holding that if
46Goldschnmidt, Legal Claims against Germany i6i (i945); Cole, Reparations and the
Future of German Industry 17 (1945).
47

Goldschmidt, Legal Claims against Germany 168 (i94S).
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the allegations of fact are proven at the trial-they may constitute a cause of acduties owed by the defendant directors to the
tion for breaches of the fiduciary
2
corporation. A brains v. Allen.
The grounds on which equity has been willing to hold directors liable at the
instance of stockholders suing on behalf of the corporation include mismanagement, 3 ultra vires acts, 4 fraudulent acts, s waste or squandering of corporate as2 74 N.E. 2d 305 (N.Y., '947). Three judges dissented. The litigation was begun in i938 and
was the subject of numerous proceedings. There were two appeals to the Appellate Division
involving the sufficiency of the other alleged causes of action. Abrams v. Allen, 266 App. Div.
835, 42 N.Y.S. 2d 641 (i943) and Leech v. Fuller, 259 App. Div. 816 (i94o). As a result of dismissals ordered at Special Terms and affirmed by the Appellate Division, supra, all of the
causes of action pleaded from time to time were dismissed, except the first, which was the subject of this appeal. The controversy underlying the litigation concerned six of Remington
Rand's plants. A number of maintenance and equipment workers had by 1934 organized into
one or more local unions. The locals were affiliated with general craft unions under the direction of the District Council of Office Equipment Workers, which the Metal Trades Department
of the A. F. of L. chartered in March, 1934. The National Labor Relations Board found that
thiswas an appropriate bargaining unit under Section 9(b) of the National Labor Relations Act,
29 U.S.C.A. § 159 (b) and entered an order in March, 1937 requiring Remington Rand to
bargain collectively with the union, and to cease and desist from restraining or coercing its
employees in their right to self-organization. The order was subsequently upheld by the Circuit Court of Appeals with modifications only as to what employees were to be reinstated.
National Labor Relations Board v. Remington Rand, 94 F. 2d 862 (C.C.A. 2d, 1938). The
controversy originated in the fall of 1935 with rumors and newspaper reports that the Company
was going to set up a plant at Elmira, New York, and dismantle corresponding plants elsewhere. The Joint Protective Board, which had superseded the District Council, sought information concerning the rumors as well as a wage increase. No high official of the company was
willing to meet with it. On May io, 1936 a strike vote was called for by the Board and was
taken throughout the locals, resulting in 3,768 votes, 3,200 for the strike. It then appeared that
one of the defendants traveled throughout the plant dissuading the workers, after which he
took a strike vote of his own, with the result that 670 workers did not vote and 28 were discharged. The strike was called on the 23 rd and began on the 26th. The defendants made it
known that they would no longer deal with the A. F. of L. Strikebreakers were employed and
a back-to-work movement was initiated. The strike proved unsuccessful and ended before
December. During the strike the Company had dismantled its Norwood plant, reduced production at Middletown and at Syracuse, but increased it at flian. The Elmira plant was put
into production and by the end of September the aggregate number of employees at all plants
was as great as on May 26. In its decision, from which these facts are taken, the Circuit Court
said at p. 868: "There can be no doubt that the Joint Board had represented a majority of
the employees in the original six plants, though exact figures are not obtainable."
3 Kirrane v. Boone, 334 Mo. 558, 66 S.W. 2d 861 (i933); Kavanaugh v. Commonwealth
Trust Co., 223 N.Y. 1o3, 119 N.E. 237 (i918) (lack of due care); General Rubber Co. v.
Benedict, 215 N.Y. 18, xo9 N.E. 96 (1915) (lack of due care); see Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U.S.
132 (i891); Hun v. Carey, 82 N.Y. 65 (i88o); Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939) (lack
of good faith); Wheeler v. Abilene Nat. Bank Bldg. Co., 159 Fed. 391 (C.C.A. 8th, 19o8) (lack
of good faith); Bosworth v. Allen, 168 N.Y. 157 , 6x N.E. 163 (19ox).
4 See Hawes v. Oakland, io4 U.S. 45o (x88i); Leslie v. Lorillard, rio N.Y. 519, 18 N.E. 363
(i888); Carson, Current Phases of Derivative Actions Against Directors, 40 Mich. L. Rev.
1125 (1942), asserting that no authority will be found for holding corporate directors liable for
honest action on their part taken without negligence outside the corporate powers.
s James v. Steifer Mining Co., 35 Cal. App. 778, 171 Pac. 117 (1918); Smith v. Nevada
Copper & Mining Co., 137 Wash. 317, 242 Pac. 367 (1926); Toebelman v. Missouri-Kansas
Pipe Line Co., 41 F. Supp. 334 (Del., 1941). The attribution of fraud to directors is the
main ingredient of minority stockholder actions, yet in very few such actions have plaintiffg
succeeded in proving either actual or constructive fraud. Carson, op. cit. supra note 4, at i 121
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sets, 6 diversion of funds,7 payment of unwarranted compensation to officers and
directors,8 and using the corporate property for the doing of an unlawful or immoral act. 9 Such derivative actions, however, have been much abused in recent
years.'- As a consequence, the courts have sought to discourage derivative actions by strict construction of pleadingse' and by confining liability to only the
most flagrant abuses of fiduciary duty.- Moreover, in several states, including
6

1Hazard v. Wright, 201 N.Y. 399,94 N.E. 85S (19i1); Greenwood v. Greenblatt, 173

Ga.

ss', 16i S.E. 135 (1931); Liken v.Shaffer, 64 F. Supp. 432, (Iowa, 1946).

7Yates Ranch Oil & Royalties v. Jones, ioo F. 2d 419 (C.C.A. sth, i938); Backus v.Finkelstein, 23 F. 2d 531 (D.C. Minn., 1924); Tasler v. Peerless Tire Co., 144 Minn. i5o, 174 N.W.
731 (i919); Orlando Orange Groves Co. v. Hale, 107 Fla. 304, 144 So. 674 (1932); Brinckerhoff
v. Bostwick, 88 N.Y. 52 (1882); Quintal v. Keliner, 264 N.Y. 32, 189 N.E. 770 (1934); Bowers
v. Male, i86 N.Y. 28, 78 N.E. 577 (19o6).
8
Wight v. Heublein, 238 Fed. 321 (C.C.A. 4th, i916); Thauer v. Gaebler, 202 Wis. 296,
232 N.W. 561 (193o); Marony v. Applegate, 29 N.Y.S. 2d 421 (i941).

9Continental Securities Co. v. Belmont, 206 N.Y. 7 (1912) (illegal transfer of stocks and
bonds); Van Schaik v. Carr, 17o N.Y. Misc. 539, io N.Y.S. 2d 569 (I939) (violation of the New
York insurance laws); Corsica Nat. Bank v. Johnson, 251 U.S. 68 (1920) (illegal loan); Broderick v. Marcus, 152 N.Y. Misc. 413, 272 N.Y. Supp. 455 (i934) (violation of banking statute).
But see Simon v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 179 N.Y. Misc. 202, aff'd 267 App. Div. 89o (i944).
10Stockholders' suits for mismanagement "have been abused quite as much as the powers
of the directors they have intended to restrain." Pound, Visitatorial Jurisdiction over Corporations in Equity, 49 Harv. L. Rev. 369, 395 (1936). Among the major abuses have been the
"strike suit," brought on what may be a valid claim but for the real purpose of extorting a
settlement. The most widely known "sue and settle man" was Clarence H. Venner, whose reported suits ran into the hundreds. 22 Time, No. i, at 52 (July 3, 1933). The "collusive suit,"
brought by stockholders friendly to the defendants for purposes of making bona fide actions
impossible or more difficult has also been used extensively. For a catalogue of abuses and the
citation of authorities see Hornstein, Legal Controls for Intracorporate Abuse-Present and
Future, 41 Col. L. Rev. 4o5, 406 (I94I); Hornstein, Problems of Procedure in Derivative
Suits, 42 Col. L. Rev. 574, 583 (1942); Carson, Further Phases of Derivative Actions Against
Directors, 29 Corn. L. Q. 431 (i944). The private settlement and the stockholders' right to retain money which is paid to him in return for dismissing a derivative suit has been the main
source of abuse. See Application of the Rule of Young v. Higbee Co. to Stockholder Derivative
Suits, 13 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 321, 323 (1946) for a complete discussion and the collection of
authorities. Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A. foll. § 723c (i94i)
prohibits dismissal or compromise without approval of the court, but this does not remedy the
situation where the striker is bought off before filing suit or where the plaintiff's attorney is
the real instigator in the hope of receiving sizable attorney's fees in the event the court permits a compromise. The decision of the New York Court of Appeals in Clarke v. Greenberg,
71 N.E. 2d 443 (N.Y., 1947), noted in x4 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 673 (1947), which held that the
proceeds realized by a stockholder in a derivative suit by way of private settlement belong to
the corporation upset the long-standing New York rule to the contrary, Beadeston v. Alley,
7 N.Y. Supp. 747 (Sup. Ct., 1889).
- In Price v. Standard Oil Co., 55 N.Y.S. 2d 89o, 893 (i945) the court said: Undoubtedly the tendency of the courts of this state in recent years has been to insist more rigorously on the requirement that in a derivative stockholder's suit facts, rather than conclusory assertions, characterizations and charges, must be set forth in the complaint." Accord:
Oshrin v. Celanese Corp., 291 N.Y. 170, 5I N.E. 2d 694 (I943); Weinberger v. Quinn, 29o
N.Y. 635, 49 N.E. 2d 131 (i943); Lifshutz v. Adams, 290 N.Y. 707, 49 N.E. 2d 635 (I943);
Kalmanash v. Smith, 291 N.Y. 142, 51 N.E. 2d 681 (1943).
- In Everett v. Phillips, 288 N.Y. 227, 232, 43 N.E. 2d 18, 19 (1942) the court said: "Yet,
however high may be the standard of fidelity to duty which the court may exact, errors of
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New York, the legislatures have passed "security for expenses" legislation 13
which has greatly narrowed the class of eligible plaintiffs.4
The Appellate Division had applied in the instant case the well known "business judgment rule." s The rule, in effect, means that the judgment of corporate
directors is presumed to be formed in good faith and designed to promote the
corporate interests, and that in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to
the contrary equity will not interfere with the directors' formulation and execution of business policy. 6
The courts have, nonetheless, used language that indicates the requirement
of a high standard of loyalty and have usually insisted upon a disinterested performance of duty by directors as fiduciaries. 7 It has been said frequently that
the relation of the directors to the stockholders is one of confidence and fidelity
and is governed by principles similar to those found in trust and agency law 8
judgment by directors do not alone suffice to demonstrate the lack of fidelity. That is true even
though the errors may be so gross that they may demonstrate unfitness of the directors to
manage the corporate affairs."
13 The New York statute provides that a stockholder-plaintiff who owns less than 5 per
cent of the outstanding stock of any class or lessthan $5o,ooo worth of stock of any class may
be required by the corporation to post security for reasonable expenses, including attorney
fees. N.Y. Cons. Laws (Thompson, 1944) c. 668 § 61-b. See N.J. Rev. Stat. ('945) tit. x4, c. 3,
§ 15; Md. Laws (1945) c. 989; Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon Supp., 1945) tit. 12, § z322; Wis. Laws
(1945) c. 462, § i8o. 13. The New Yorklegislation has been severely criticized as a design of the
Chamber of Commerce unfairly to insulate directors from responsibility for abuses, and as
premised on the theory that most stockholder suits are groundless. Hornstein, The Death
Knell of Stockholders' Derivative Suits in New York, 32 Calif. L. Rev. 123 (1944); Hornstein,
New Aspects of Stockholders' Derivative Suits, 47 Col. L. Rev. 1 (947). See House, Stockholders' Suits and the Coudert-Mitchell Laws, 2o N.Y.U. L.Q. Rev. 377 (1945). But see
Carson, Further Phases of Derivative Actions Against Directors, 39 Corn. L.Q. 431
('944); Recent Changes Affecting Minority Stockholders' Suits, 8 Md. L. Rev. 241 (1944). The
New York Legislature, in re-defining the period of the statute of limitations for suits in equity,
has further narrowed the class of eligible plaintiffs. House, Early Exoneration for Delinquent
Directors in New York, 46 Col. L. Rev. 377 (1946).
14 The constitutionality of the New York legislation is still in doubt, since lower courts have
divided. Cases are collected in Hornstein, New Aspects of Stockholders' Derivative Suits, 47
Col. L. Rev. 1,5 0947)XSSee Gamble v. Queens County Water Co., 123 N.Y. gi, 98, 25 N.E. 201, 208 (i89o). The
courts have constantly reiterated that directors are not liable for mere errors of judgment.
Davis v. Lowsville Gas & Electric Co., i6 Del. Ch. 157, I 4 2 Atl. 654 (1928); Everett v. Phillips,
288 N.Y. 227, 43 N.E. 2d I8 (942); Kalmanash v. Smith, 291 N.Y. 142, 51 N.E. 2d 68r
(1943); Hornstein v. Paramount Pictures, 292 N.Y. 468, 55 N.E. 2d 74o (i944); Chelrob, Inc.
v. Barrett, 293 N.Y. 442, 57 N.E. 2d 825 (I944).
.6 Davis v. Lowsville Gas & Electric Co., i6 Del. Ch. 157 , 169, 142 Atl. 654, 659 (1928).
See cases collected note iS supra.
'7See Twin-Lick Oil Co. v. Marbury, 9i U.S. 587 (1875); Blaustein v. Pan American
Petroleum & Transport Co., 293 N.Y. 28,, 56 N.E. 2d 7o5 (1944); Kavanaugh v. Kavanaugh
Knitting Co., 226 N.Y. 185, 123 N.E. 148 (i919); Litwin v. Allen, 25 N.Y.S. 2d 667
(i94o); Bayer v. Beran, 49 N.Y.S. 2d (1944) and cases cited therein; Rest., Restitution (937)
o
§ 19 , comment a.
isKavanaugh v. Kavanaugh Knitting Co., 226 N.Y. i85, 123 N.E. 148 (ig1); Litwin v.
Allen, 25 N.Y.S. 2d 667 (194o); City Bank Farmers' Trust Co. v. Hewitt Realty Co.,
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It thus appears that two conflicting policies have been reflected in the decisions, the one seeking to curtail the abuses of the stockholder derivative suit,
and the other seeking to hold fiduciaries to the highest standards of loyalty
and duty.
The complaint in the instant case did not charge that the defendant directors
had interests adverse to the corporation, or that they dealt with it for their own
benefit, or that they were guilty of fraud. The sole question seemed to be whether the allegations set forth any wrong to the corporation by the directors as a
result of their handling of the labor dispute. The complaint went on the theory
that the "business judgment rule" is merely a protective one and was never intended as a shield for acts which go beyond its minimum salutary requirements.
The court's decision implicitly confirms this theory by imposing a greater limitation than the precedents require upon the wide latitude of discretion that directors have been permitted in their determination of business policies.
Although the decision runs counter to an unmistakable trend to greatly curtail the use of the derivative suit, clearly the court did not construct any new
category of liability. A wanton, reckless, and imprudent spoliation and waste
of corporate assets has always been sufficient ground to compel directors to account for the losses sustained by virtue of such improvident conduct.19 In the
instant case such an allegation was coupled with a charge of lack of good faith,
which has likewise hitherto been a ground for imposing liability.20 Moreover,
the dismantling and removal of corporate plants for such purposes as were here
asserted has been held to be against public policy.21 However, inasmuch as the
stockholders complained only of excesses in the execution of the directors' labor
policy rather than of the policy itself,- the decision cannot be taken to mean
that liability may be imposed upon directors solelybecause theypursued an antilabor policy. Rather it would seem to mean only that the court has extended
a number of existing grounds of liability to establish a new limitation on the directors' judgment in a labor dispute.
The Court of Appeals must have realized, however, that its decision was virtually an open invitation for similar and related actions to be brought. The deS
cision is, therefore, suggestive of a range of possibilities of new developments in
the realm of intracorporate struggles for control and in the realm of labor-management relations.
N.Y. 62, 177 N.E. 309 (1931); Hornstein v. Paramount Pictures, 292 N.Y. 468, 55 N.E.
2d 740 (I944) and cases cited therein; see Stevens, Corporations § 138 (i936); Ballantine,
Corporations § 114 (1947).
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X'Cases cited note 6 supra.
20Cases cited note 3 supra.
National Labor Relations Board v. Cape County Milling Co., i4o F. 2d 543 (C.C.A. 8th,
1944); National Labor Relations Board v. Remington Rand, 94 F. 2d 8562 (C.C.A. 2d, 1938).
-The National Labor Relations Act went into effect in July 1935 but was not upheld by
the Supreme Court until April 1937. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 301 U.S. I (937). The stockholders did not allege that the defendant had no right
to challenge the constitutionality of the Act.
21
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Such allegations as were made in the instant case may be difficult to prove in
a trial court; but nevertheless, if they are sufficient to constitute a cause of action, corporate directors may find themselves defending a host of damage suits
or petitions for injunctions seeking to hold them answerable for their labor policies. The effect of such possible litigation as a check on a "get tough with labor" psychology is dependent upon several factors. In New York and a few
other states where the existing "security for expenses" legislation confines the
class of possible plaintiffs, it is not as likely that the labor policies of a corporation would be challenged from within as it is in other states where the holding of
a certain designated large amount of stock or the posting of security is not a condition precedent to the filing of a stockholder suit. In these latter states the theory of the instant case might prepare the way for an assault on corporate antilabor policies by stockholders who can show that their company would make,
or would have made, more money in the long run by pursuing a more liberal
labor policy. The value of such suits to stockholders would not necessarily depend on the possibility of winning injunctions orlarge recoveries. Even nominal
damages would be a powerful weapon where a minority of stockholders is attempting to influence a recalcitrant management to adopt a progressive labor
policy. Cyrus Eaton, writing in a recent issue of the Review,23 described what he
called "the classical example of managerial folly": a corporation head, who swore
he would retire from business before he would let his plants be organized, spent
twenty million dollars of his stockholders' money in a futile fight against a
strike for union recognition with the result that his fellow industrialists placed
their orders with concerns whose more dependable labor relations assured better
delivery. The only tangible result, according to Mr. Eaton, was an occasional
word of praise from Westbrook Pegler. A stockholder suit, however, under these
circumstances, with the resulting publicity and the possibility of securing an injunction or large damages, might have had the more tangible result of bringing
about a reversal of managerial policy.
Corporate development in our economy has long since reached a stage "in
which the individual interest of the shareholder is definitely made subservient
to the will of a controlling group of managers even though the capital of the
enterprise is made up of the aggregated contribution of perhaps many thousands of individuals."24 The stockholder, who in the early days of corporate development had somewhat the nature of a partner or joint-venturer, would now
seem to have no property rights in the enterprise beyond that of having it conducted in the best interest of his pocketbook. The "business judgment rule" is
equivalent to a definition of the stockholder's property rights, and as applied
by the courts, relegates him to a virtually passive and forgotten status. As a consequence, the courts have never given any indication that it is within the purview of a stQckholder suit to seek the solution of public problems.
3Eaton, A Capitalist Looks at Labor, 14 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 332, 336 (I947).
24Berle and Means, The Modem Corporation and Private Property 277 (i934).

RECENT CASES

The question, however, of how public problems might possibly be fitted into
the category of stockholders' monetary interests for the purpose of bringing a
derivative suit is suggested by the instant case and by the leading case of
Dodge v. FordMotor Company.25 There a program of expansion and price reduction for purposes of giving employment to more people, producing more cars,
and bringing them within the reach of more people was held to be contrary to
the financial advantage of the stockholders, and the company was forced to declare a dividend instead of implementing its program. If, however, stockholders
can state a cause of action against directors for pursuing an imprudent and
costly anti-labor policy, a cause of action might equally be made out where a
corporation pursues a racially discriminatory and costly employment policy,
or where it seeks to enforce restrictive covenants at the expense of community
good will with consequent loss of revenues, or where it might, for example, require a political or religious test for employment, with the same result. In such
instances the stockholders' monetary losses might be considerably more remote
than in the case of directors selling goods to their corporation at a large personal
profit, but they would be nonetheless real, and perhaps no more remote than
in the Ford case. Although in the type of cases mentioned the defense under the
"business judgment rule" might still prove insurmountable, the decision of the
Court of Appeals in the instant case would seem to be encouragement enough
for actions of this nature to be attempted. Should experience show that, although such suits were being brought in good faith, their chief value was harassment, and the number of recoveries was negligible, the flood of litigation might
very well result in stricter construction of pleadings by the courts or in new legislation restricting the bringing of stockholder suits.
A final factor tending to govern the effect of such possible litigation is the incipient "economic planning" element that is present whenever courts interfere
with the business conduct of enterprises. As yet, not even the most enthusiastic
votaries of a planned economy have suggested that the courts are the appropriate agency for effectuating it. In view, however, of the extent of economic
planning that already necessarily exists in our tightly interwoven social fabric,
the courts may become more concerned with adjusting the established rights of
individuals where corporate planning is not in the interests of the shareholders.

EXTENSION OF FIDUCIARY DUTIES IN SETTLEMENT OF DERIVATIVE SUITS: A FOOTNOTE TO YOUNG V. HIGBEE
In r944, the Supreme Court, in Young v. Higbee Co.,' imposed a fiduciary
duty upon two preferred shareholders who had contested a reorganization under the Bankruptcy Act and who had dropped the suit after a private settlement while an appeal was pending from an adverse decision. It was held that
25
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Mich. 459, i7O N.W. 668

(igig).

1324

U.S. 204

(1945).

